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WHILE  THE  INTERNATIONAL  MONETARY  SYSTEM iS constantly  evolving, 
most changes are relatively minor so that certain periods of history can be 
characterized  by a particular monetary standard. The best description of 
current monetary arrangements  is the dollar standard. The dollar standard 
may well be the best arrangement  for the international monetary system of 
today, but there is little reason to expect or to desire it to be maintained 
indefinitely into the future. The purpose of this paper is to examine the 
proper balance-of-payments  policy for the United States during the period 
of the dollar standard. 
At the outset it might be useful to clarify what is meant by a U.S. balance- 
of-payments policy. A  balance-of-payments policy measure is a govern- 
mental action whose primary  purpose is not related to a domestic economic 
need and that would not be undertaken except for a perception of a dis- 
equilibrium  in the balance of payments. This negative approach to a defini- 
tion  is  necessary because all economic  policies in  one  way  or  another 
influence the balance of payments; motivation rather than consequence 
must, therefore, be the distinguishing  characteristic.  Thus the 1968 tax sur- 
charge was not a balance-of-payments  policy by this definition even though 
it had substantial impact on the U.S.  external position and was even de- 
* I wish to acknowledge  the valuable  comments  of Walter  Salant  on an earlier  draft  of 
this paper. 
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scribed as a balance-of-payments measure by the President.' On the other 
hand, the program of mandatory controls on foreign direct investment 
administered by  the  Office of  Foreign  Direct  Investment (OFDI)  is  a 
balance-of-payments measure. 
Not  all policies are easy to classify. The timid monetary policy pursued 
by the Federal Reserve in the years following the 1960-61 recession may 
have contained elements of a balance-of-payments policy. However, one 
can fully explain monetary conditions in those years in terms of the infla- 
tion-unemployment preferences  of the Federal Reserve System as revealed 
after the 1953-54 and 1957-58 recessions.2 
It  is  also necessary to  consider more explicitly the  objective of  U.S. 
balance-of-payments policy.  Under  existing international monetary ar- 
rangements, other countries can exhaust their international reserves and 
must, therefore, take policy actions to avoid that contingency. All balance- 
of-payments measures of  other countries can be considered attempts to 
defend a fixed exchange value of their currencies-either  the existing rate 
or a new rate. Canada, during both the past and current  periods of a flexible 
exchange rate, is an obvious exception. 
In contrast, the United States cannot run out of international  reserves as 
long as the world stays on the dollar standard. The dollar is the world's 
principal reserve currency for other countries and the United States itself. 
Deficits on official  settlements  can be financed  by increases  in U.S. liabilities 
and, therefore, the finite size of U.S. reserve assets is not an operative con- 
straint on the United States. To be sure, at some hypothetical rate of ac- 
cumulation, other countries will exercise their legal right to convert their 
official dollar holdings into gold. Significant official conversions of dollars 
to gold would mark the end of the dollar standard. The apocalyptic nature 
of dollar-gold conversions is well understood by industrial countries and 
this knowledge prevents large-scale conversions. Flexible exchange rates 
are an alternative to the dollar standard or any standard based on fixed 
1. "Balance  of Payments,"  Statement  by the President  Outlining  a Program  of Action, 
Jan. 1, 1968, Weekly  Compilation  of Presidential  Documents,  Vol. 4 (1968), pp. 20-26. 
2. Whether  one uses the interest  rate on Treasury  bills, the growth of the monetary 
base, total reserves  of member  banks, or some adjusted  concept  of reserve  growth  as an 
indicator,  monetary  policy after 1960-61 was more expansionary  than the policies pur- 
sued during  the two previous  periods  of recovery,  when  the U.S. balance  of payments  was 
not an issue.  Board  of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve  System,  Historical  Chart  Book, 
1969, and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, "Triangles  of U.S. Economic Data," 
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exchange rates, and their adoption (even on the crawling peg-automatic 
formula basis) would end the present arrangement. The United States is 
the central  figure  in the dollar standard  system, and its balance-of-payments 
objective is to maintain the viability of the system. 
The dollar standard is quite different from what was intended by the 
framers of the Bretton Woods agreement and in some respects differs from 
the system actually in operation during much of the postwar period. The 
Bretton Woods agreement viewed the United States as another country in 
the system-different  in dimension but not in kind. The United States was 
considered able to  control its balance of  payments and was to  be held 
accountable for it. The reserve position of the United States was thought 
to constrain U.S. policy, either through a loss of reserve assets or through 
a deterioration  in the ratio of reserve assets to liquid liabilities to foreigners, 
like the United Kingdom and France. In the event of a fundamental dis- 
equilibrium,  the dollar was expected to be devalued or appreciated.  In fact, 
the system never worked in this manner. The problem of recovery from 
World War II proved too great for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the International  Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 
and the United States stepped into the breach, accepting the responsibility 
for the recovery of the entire noncommunist world. Even after production 
exceeded prewar levels and the  recovery period per se  had ended, the 
United States continued to bear the responsibility for the viability of the 
system and continues to do so. Thus despite the fact that the U.S. balance 
of payments was in deficit for much of the 1950s, the prevailing view was 
that a dollar shortage was present because the system required the dollars 
resulting  from the deficit. If the United States had been like other countries, 
the balance-of-payments  results would have been interpreted as a weakness 
requiring  correction. 
Nevertheless, gold still had an important role in the system. If other 
countries on balance accumulated more dollars than they desired, they 
were expected to convert the excess into gold-the  ultimate reserve asset 
of the system-and  the U.S.  loss of reserve assets would indicate to the 
United States the necessity of restraining the dollar outflow. There was 
always some ambiguity  in the signal since actual gold conversions depended 
as much on which countries were reserve accumulators-central  banks had 
noticeably different  reserve preferences vis-a-vis gold-as  on the aggregate 
of the outflow. Nevertheless, the United States did respond to gold losses, 
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London gold market in 1954). For many years the system was adequate, as 
most newly mined gold ended up in U.S. monetary reserves or in the IMF 
as a part of the periodic quota increases. As long as there was a substantial 
and steady increase in the aggregate of monetary gold,  other countries 
could ask for and obtain gold conversions from the United States without 
weakening the system. Even if the United States was a net loser of gold, 
the system was still viable because U.S.  losses could be recouped from 
increases in subsequent years. Thus the arrangement could be properly 
described as a gold-dollar standard. 
The system was converted into an unhyphenated dollar standard when 
gold no longer could adequately perform its monetary role. If a commodity 
is to be useful as money, its nonmonetary value in the absence of monetary 
demand must be nil or at best much below its officially  supported monetary 
value. This condition no longer exists for gold. Rising money incomes, new 
industrial uses for gold, and the constant rise in the money costs of mining 
have fundamentally  altered the private demand-supply  relation so that gold 
is no longer in excess private supply and has become unusable as money.3 
This condition was anticipated by private gold speculators, who through 
their own accumulation of gold helped further to undermine the usefulness 
of gold as money. The change took place in the early 1960s, but was not 
recognized until later because of  substantial Russian  gold  sales during 
1963-65. The conversion to a pure dollar standard evolved as the United 
States became less and less willing to sell gold to central banks; it was codi- 
fied by the Washington gold accord in March 1968, which set up the two- 
tier gold market. 
If the United States is the central country in the dollar standard, what is 
its proper balance-of-payments policy stance for preserving the system? 
I believe the United States should pursue a passive policy. By this I mean 
policy makers should refuse to take any measure in response to the usual 
signals  of  trouble  from  the  balance-of-payments accounts-persistent 
change in the net reserve position-but  they should display a willingness 
to shore up the system when it is threatened. 
To  avoid misunderstanding, I  wish to  make clear my belief that the 
United States, because of its relative wealth, has a responsibility to provide 
real resources to other countries. The policy actions required to do this are 
3. Milton Gilbert,  The  Gold-Dollar  System: Conzditions  of Equilibrium  and the  Price of 
Gold, Essays in International  Finance, No.  70 (Princeton  University, Department of 
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straightforward:  appropriations  for foreign aid and a willingness to permit 
and possibly even to encourage the outflow of long-term private capital. 
But these are not balance-of-payments measures. 
Types of Balance-of-Payments  Policies 
One can view countries as choosing between two courses of action in 
response to  balance-of-payments difficulties, and within each  of  them, 
between two major variants of policy. They can either adapt themselves to 
disequilibria or attempt to correct them. If adaptation is chosen, then the 
country can either finance the disequilibrium  (reduce or increase net inter- 
national reserves) or suppress it, by acting directly or indirectly on inter- 
national transactions. If it pursues suppression, the balance-of-payments 
benefits are not sustainable once the policy measure is relaxed. 
If correction is desired, then countries can follow  either expenditure- 
reducing or expenditure-switching  policies. Expenditure-reducing  policies 
require reduction of aggregate demand below full capacity levels and the 
maintenance of this condition until competitive improvement occurs. Ex- 
penditure-switching policies  require measures to  change  relative prices 
directly so  that domestic resources are utilized rather than foreign re- 
sources.4 
As  with  most  classification schemes,  the  distinctions  between  these 
courses are not as sharp as they may seem at first. All balance-of-payments 
difficulties  under fixed exchange rates require somiie  financing, because time 
is required for corrective measures to  become effective, even if they are 
begun immediately  upon discovery of the problem. Thus only when financ- 
ing is not associated with any corrective measure is the approach adaptive. 
There is also some ambiguity concerning measures to  suppress disequi- 
libria. Some, like temporary border charges, quotas, capital controls, and 
the like, are fairly straightforward.  But another class of measures that act 
on aggregate demand to suppress a disequilibrium, like the British "stop- 
go" policies of the mid-1960s, is not easily distinguished from expenditure- 
reducing corrective policies. The difference lies in the effect that manage- 
4. See "Towards  a General  Theory  of the Balance  of Payments,"  Chap. 6 in Harry  G. 
Johnson, Intern2ational  Trade and Economic  Growth (Cambridge:  Harvard University 
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ment of demand has on international competitiveness (and illustrates yet 
another instance of the way international economics is hampered by the 
inadequacy of economic theory-in  this instance, inflation theory). In re- 
sponse to a balance-of-payments deficit, a country might reduce the level 
of domestic economic activity through monetary and fiscal policies, causing 
greater unemployment than it usually considers desirable. The purpose of 
the action would be to reduce domestic absorption of tradable goods and 
services and to improve the international competitiveness of the economy 
by reducing  the rate of domestic price inflation. If it turns out that no com- 
petitive improvement has been obtained after domestic economic activity 
recovers to a more normal level, then the policy has been adaptive rather 
than corrective. 
Indeed, it is the uncertainty of obtaining corrective results from expendi- 
ture-reducing policies  at  tolerable costs  that  has  elevated expenditure- 
switching policies to primary importance throughout the postwar period. 
Without question, exchange rate adjustments are the most  efficient in- 
strument for effecting a policy of switching expenditures from abroad to 
home. To be sure, exchange rate changes must be supported by appropriate 
monetary and fiscal policies. In a pure switching strategy, however, these 
measures are not  undertaken to  change the level of domestic economic 
activity, but to avoid a change resulting from the exchange rate move itself. 
It is because exchange rate changes are so important in maintaining and 
restoring balance-of-payments equilibrium that so much attention is now 
being given to improving the mechanism for carrying them out. 
Rationale for a Passive U.S. Strategy 
A  passive balance-of-payments strategy would  involve  only  adaptive 
policies of the financing variety. One may well question whether this is a 
new strategy for the United States or why, if new, it is appropriate now. 
While financing has long played an essential role in the U.S.  approach to 
the balance of payments, other policies-particularly  those  of  a deficit- 
suppressing variety-have  also been very important. While less emphasis 
has been placed on nonfinancing policies by the Nixon administration, new 
measures of this type are still being considered. 
In previous periods of history when there was a well-functioning inter- 
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the system. Outstanding examples are the periods before  1914 when the 
United Kingdom was dominant and after World War II when the United 
States was unchallenged. The dominant country was crucial to the func- 
tioning  of  the  system because it  operated the  adjustment mechanism 
through direct measures. When other countries on balance were in deficit, 
it restored equilibrium in part by forcing the deficit countries to change 
their policies and in part by direct measures deliberately  designed to weaken 
its own reserve position, such as income transfers abroad. When other 
countries on balance were in surplus, adjustment was brought about in 
part again by leverage on the policies of other countries and in part by a 
deterioration  in the liquidity position of the dominant country. The United 
States is no longer strong enough to operate the system in this fashion and 
that is why a change in strategy is now required. 
The weakening of the United States relative to other countries can be 
attributed to a number of factors. Probably in major part it is due to the 
natural catching-up process that goes on in the absence of calamities. This 
process may have been accelerated somewhat, however, by the operations 
of multinational companies and other developments. The relative weaken- 
ing is also due to the much larger fraction of domestic resources devoted 
to unproductive  military uses in the United States. Among industrial coun- 
tries the relationship between proportion of income devoted to defense and 
rate of per capita economic growth is not very strong, but it is negative for 
obvious reasons. Finally the development of exclusive economic institu- 
tions like the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA) tends to promote the economic interests 
of member countries in part at the expense of nonmembers. These factors 
are in the main not reversible and it would probably be undesirable  to re- 
verse them even if it were possible to do so. 
A  passive balance-of-payments policy would improve the situation in 
two ways: First, it would tend to strengthen the United States directly and, 
second, it would improve the international adjustment  mechanism and thus 
render other countries less dependent on the United States. An enumera- 
tion of U.S. balance-of-payments  policies that could be eliminated with the 
adoption of  a passive strategy hints at the possible cost  savings to  the 
United  States. Some  of  these policies are of  long  standing and rather 
innocuous, like the export promotion activities of the Department of Com- 
merce and the subsidized  lending of the Export-Import Bank. More serious, 
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developed countries be spent only in the United States-so  called "tying" 
-a  practice that sustains economic inefficiency in the United States. The 
imposition of "additionality provisions," which require that aid funds be 
not merely substitutive for nonaided purchases in the United States, has 
intensified the impact of tying. Some U.S. military expenditures have been 
directed to domestic suppliers even in the face of a 50 percent differential 
in  costs  favoring foreign procurement. This practice, for instance, was 
estimated to have cost the government between $30 million and $40 million 
in fiscal year 1964 alone.5 The generalized "Buy America" preferences at 
all levels of government are of a similar, if less extreme, nature.6 
Since 1963, the United States has levied an interest equalization tax on 
portfolio investment which discriminates against investments in developed 
countries except new  Canadian issues.  Shortly thereafter the  so-called 
voluntary program administered  by the Federal Reserve was added to limit 
foreign lending by commercial banks. At that time the companion volun- 
tary program on direct investm%-ent  was initiated. In  1968, the voluntary 
program was converted into the mandatory OFDI program, with substan- 
tial controls over the operations of direct investors. 
Even if all of the above policies and programs were to be abolished, the 
improvement in overall U.S.  economic performance would be marginal. 
A further  gain might come from improved management of fiscal and mone- 
tary policy if decision makers did not worry about the balance of payments. 
Even though no major shortcoming of demand management in the United 
States within recent years can be attributed to balance-of-payments con- 
siderations, some minor improvements might have been possible in the 
early 1960s. 
Currently the administration has recommended a change in corporate 
tax laws to permit deferral of tax liabilities on export sales. It is also sup- 
porting on balance-of-payments grounds the expenditure of public funds 
for the development of a supersonic commercial aircraft.  An even more far- 
reaching proposal, supposedly under consideration primarily  because of its 
balance-of-payments  effects, is the conversion of the corporate income tax 
5. Testimony  of Charles  J. Hitch, in Bala,ice of Payments-1965, Hearings  before a 
Subcommittee  of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency,  89 Cong. 1 sess. 
(1965), Pt. 1, p. 176. 
6. Some measures,  like the reduction  of tariff  exemptions  for tourist  expenditures  and 
the tax law  revision  against  foreign  tax havens,  are fully  defensible  on the grounds  of sim- 
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and social security tax systems into a value-added tax along European lines. 
All of these proposals may have some merit on other grounds, but if they 
were enacted for balance-of-payments reasons, then some economic  in- 
efficiency could be engendered. 
The  second  and more  important rationale for  a  passive balance-of- 
payments strategy for the United States is the expected improvement in the 
international adjustment  mechanism that would result. The most effective 
instrument for adjustment  (as distinct from adaptation) has been exchange 
rate changes, but they have become more difficult to  effect properly in 
recent years. The freeing of capital movements from government restric- 
tions in the 1950s, plus the increase in private liquid asset holdings, has 
made currency speculation possible, and sometimes very rewarding, for 
private interests at the expense of governments, when they finally make 
changes in currency parities. Furthermore, exchange rate changes have 
come to be looked upon as reflections of failure of economic policy rather 
than as instruments  for achieving greater economic efficiency. As has been 
widely recognized, an improvement in the mechanism is required.7  Clearly 
the mechanism would work better if exchange rates were changed promptly 
in  response to  maladjustments; this  would  probably increase their fre- 
quency and reduce their average size. 
A  passive U.S.  strategy will help improve the mechanism because the 
United States will no longer be suppressing its deficit or surplus and there- 
fore will help expose maladjustments  in the system so that they can be more 
easily corrected by others. Because of the basic nature of the dollar stan- 
dard, the United States cannot change the exchange value of its currency 
and it need not do so to maintain the equilibrium of the system. The United 
States can change only the dollar price of gold and if a return to the gold- 
dollar standard or even to  a pure gold standard were desired, then an 
increase in the price of gold would be needed. But the price of gold and the 
exchange value of the dollar are logically distinct and should not be con- 
fused. As is well known, in a system of N countries, only N  -  1  exchange 
rates need be kept in equilibrium  for the system as a whole to be in equilib- 
7.  George  N.  Halm  (ed.),  Approaches  to  Greater  Flexibility  of  Exchange  Rates 
(Princeton  University  Press,  1970);  International  Monetary  Fund, Thle  Role of Exchanige 
Rates  in  the Adjustmzenit  of  Itnternationcal  Paymenits (IMF,  1970);  Stephen  Marris,  The 
Burgenstock Communiqud:  A Critical Examination of the Case for Limited Flexibility  of 
Exchanige Rates, Essays  in International  Finance,  No. 90 (Princeton  University,  Depart- 
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rium.8 If all other countries adjust their dollar exchange rates, then the 
United States need not exercise any control. 
In his paper, Stephen Marris raises the possibility that the United States 
might initiate a change in exchange rates if it appears that a number of 
important countries ought to appreciate their rates simultaneously against 
the dollar (simultaneous depreciations have not been as much of a problem 
in the past).9 He points out that a single country might be reluctant to 
appreciate against the dollar for fear that it might be alone in correcting 
its undervaluation and thus that its balance-of-payments surplus might be 
converted into a deficit if it appreciates unilaterally. Marris argues that if 
the U.S. initiates the change, then all the surplus countries might permit 
their rates to appreciate  because it would not take a positive action on their 
part to go along. 
The Marris argument is not very convincing to me. Obviously the eco- 
nomic consequences will be much the same no matter who takes the initia- 
tive as long as the same exchange parity is established. But U.S.  action 
destabilizes reserve holdings, since a U.S. devaluation involves an increase 
in the price of gold, or special drawing  rights  (SDRs), or both. Furthermore, 
as was noted before, exchange rate adjustments require supporting mone- 
tary and fiscal measures. The countries involved should be able to pick the 
timing of  the  rate change so  they can coordinate other policy  actions. 
Indeed, if countries choose to adapt to disequilibrium by financing them- 
selves, that should also be their prerogative. This form of adaptation, if it 
represents a long-term, consistent policy, would impose no burden on the 
system as a whole or on the United States in particular, if it is following a 
passive strategy. If the exchange rate mechanism is going to be improved, 
governments will  have  to  get  over their psychological  hangups  about 
initiating a change, although the United  States may play a useful role. 
Operating Characteristics  of the System 
A passive balance-of-payments strategy means that in the event of large 
official settlement deficits-and  likewise of  large surpluses-the  United 
States would  refrain from  any policy  action.  The  United  States could 
8.  Ronald  I.  McKinnon,  Private and Official Internzationial  Moniey: The Case for  the 
Dollar, Essays in International  Finance, No. 74 (Princeton  University,  Department  of 
Economics,  International  Finance  Section, 1969). 
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undertake special financing measures, and even call them military offset 
arrangements  if that were thought desirable from a political point of view, 
but they would have no economic significance. In reality the United States 
may not have an alternative to a passive strategy and the only operative 
question may be whether such a strategy is utilized to its fullest advantage. 
As  is seen in Table 1, annual changes in the official settlements balance 
Table 1. Annual Changes in Balances of International  Payments, 1960-69 
Millions of dollars 
Balanices  Aiinlnal  changes 
Goods an2d  Official  Goods antd  Official 
Year  services  settlemenits  services  Capital flows  settlements 
1960  5, 898  -  3,403  ... 
1961  7,087  -1,347  1,189  867  2,056 
1962  6, 688  -2,702  -399  -956  -1,  355 
1963  7,546  -2,011  858  167  691 
1964  9,920  -  1,564  2,374  1,927  447 
1965  8,749  -  1,289  -  1,171  1,446  275 
1966  6,302  266  -2,447  4,002  1,555 
1967  6,117  -3,418  -185  -3,499  -3,684 
1968  3,296  1,641  -2,821  7,880  5,059 
1969  2,709  2,708  -587  1,654  1,067 
Source: U.S.  Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics, 1969 Buisiness  Statistics (1970), 
p. 14; Survey  of Currett  Busitiess, Vol. 50 (June 1970 and August 1970), pp. 35 and S-3, respectively. 
since 1964 have been dominated by changes in the capital account, pri- 
marily by flows that are responsive to shifts in monetary policy. The ex- 
perience of the United States in recent years dictates that the monetary 
instrument be available for domestic economic needs and not be encum- 
bered by balance-of-payments  considerations. Apart from monetary policy, 
anything that might be done to influence  the balance of payments would be 
inconsequential. Thus an announced passive strategy merely makes a virtue 
of a necessity. 
However, the new virtue has concomitant obligations. When the United 
States sets its domestic economic objectives and fashions its policy instru- 
ments to meet them, it must keep the rest of the world in mind. If the 
United States is to be the fixed point in the system, its economic perfor- 
mance must be reasonably predictable. This means it must avoid extremes 
of inflation and recession. To reflect the interest of other countries in U.S. 
economic  policy  decisions,  foreign governments should  have  a  right- 350  Lawrence B. Krause 
indeed, an obligation-to  state what they believe are the best policies for 
achieving U.S. goals as determined primarily  by the United States. Ameri- 
cans must welcome the advice of  other countries both in public and in 
private and some institutional changes may be required to  provide the 
proper forum for it. It should, however, always be kept in mind that the 
balance of payments is not a target of U.S. policy. Silence by other coun- 
tries should be interpretable  as assent to U.S. policies. 
The obligations of other countries under this system would not be much 
different  from what they are today. First, governments must recognize that 
their ability to  use monetary policy for domestic stabilization purposes 
would be greatly circumscribed. They would need to  adapt their rate of 
monetary expansion so that their interest rates would be compatible with 
those  prevailing elsewhere, as  determined primarily by  U.S.  monetary 
conditions. It has to be recognized that in any system of fixed exchange 
rates with freedom of private trade and payments, a great deal of monetary 
sovereignty has already necessarily been surrendered.10  If individual coun- 
tries or groups of countries require greater leeway for independent use of 
monetary  instruments,  then some institutional changes in both the structure 
of financial markets and their regulation, and greater margins for fluctua- 
tions in spot exchange  rates, are required.  Secondly, governments should be 
willing promptly to adjust their exchange rate parities to balance-of-pay- 
ments disequilibria, in both an upward and a downward direction. If sur- 
plus countries choose to  adapt rather than adjust to undervaluations of 
their currencies,  they must be prepared to hold their accumulated reserves 
indefinitely. 
What other countries can expect is that the United States will not sup- 
press its balance-of-payments  disequilibria  as it does now. They would also 
be ill advised to try to suppress their own disequilibria, for such attempts 
are either ineffective or terribly expensive. 
Improving  the Adjustment  Mechanism 
While following a passive balance-of-payments  strategy itself, the United 
States has an obligation, beyond accepting policy advice from other coun- 
tries, to do what it can to improve the adjustment mechanism and thereby 
10. Lawrence  B. Krause,  "The  Role of Private  International  Finance  in Transnational 
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strengthen the system. The United States must indicate to other countries 
when it thinks that their exchange rates with the dollar are becoming under- 
or  overvalued. Both  bilateral channels,  and  multilateral channels  like 
Working Party 3 of the Organisation  for Economic Co-operation and De- 
velopment (OECD), might be utilized. As the defenders of the system, the 
United States should initiate discussions of exchange rates if others do not, 
to ensure prompt attention to possible deviations from equilibrium. Multi- 
lateral discussions can provide the catalyst for consideration of, and action 
on,  simultaneous appreciations or  depreciations. Fear  of  encouraging 
speculation, which has hindered frank exchange rate discussions in the 
past, can no longer be permitted to paralyze the system. 
Secondly, the United States has an obligation to do what it can to obtain 
creation of sufficient SDRs by the IMF since, in my view, all permanent 
increases in reserves should be through SDRs. If the United States is fol- 
lowing a monetary policy suited to its domestic needs, and other countries 
on balance are accumulating dollars in official holdings (not matched by 
U.S. accumulations  of SDRs above its allocated amounts), then insufficient 
SDRs are being created and the United States should press for increases in 
the allocations. It should urge a reduction in SDR creation if dollar hold- 
ings on balance are being reduced. Sufficient liquidity creation is a neces- 
sary condition for the viability of the system and, given its role, the United 
States must take the lead in the IMF  in this matter. In the absence of 
alternative criteria, revealed liquidity desires can be utilized as the guide 
for "sufficiency,"  as described above. 
Third, the United States must be prepared in extreme situations to take 
unilateral  measures  to shore up the system. It is easier to look backward  for 
illustrations than to anticipate what will be required in the future. The kind 
of measures I have in mind include the unusual loan made to Italy during 
its crisis in 1963-64, the closing of the London gold pool in March 1968, 
and the January 1968 balance-of-payments package, including the OFDI 
program itself. Each of these measures was taken when the system was 
under extreme strain that called for forceful and immediate action. In all 
cases subsequent measures were required, but relieving the crisis was of 
immense importance and best handled unilaterally by the United States. 
In response to a crisis in the future, the United States might have to act on 
international reserves by buying or selling large amounts of  SDRs  for 
dollars or gold, or conceivably complete the demonetization of gold by 
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vention in either current account or capital flows by the United  States 
might be the most effective instrument for stabilizing the system. Depend- 
ing on the circumstances, the United States must be prepared unilaterally 
to initiate a wide range of measures for temporary relief, while forcing 
efficiency-promoting  criteria to operate in the longer run. 
Viability of a Passive Strategy 
Once the desirability of a passive balance-of-payments strategy by the 
United States is assumed, its viability becomes the question. The viability 
of any system of fixed exchange rates depends on the cooperation of all of 
the large countries-called  "playing by the rules of the game" in a previous 
era. Such cooperation comes from a recognition that every country gains 
from the stability of the system. The viability of the dollar standard sim- 
ilarly depends on a belief by all countries that they gain economically from 
cooperating. The United  States would, therefore, undermine the system 
if its actions and policies convinced other countries that cooperation is 
no longer justified. 
Clearly the most important, and probably the overriding, consideration 
in this regard is the economic performance of the United  States. Other 
countries will expect the United  States to  follow  economic policies en- 
couraging reasonably stable growth with price behavior that minimizes the 
number of required parity changes in the system. The price performance 
that fits this requirement would be about modal for the system; that is, 
price increases that are neither the greatest nor the least among the major 
countries. Such price performance  implies a diminishing U.S. trade surplus, 
but a stable or growing current account balance. Excessive price increases 
by the United States will force other countries to appreciate  their currencies 
too frequently for the system to maintain its stability over time. Likewise 
too  "favorable" price performance by  the United  States will force too 
many devaluations on other countries. Exchange parities must also reflect 
differences in  national growth rates not  compensated for  by  offsetting 
marginal propensities to  import  and  eXport; however, U.S.  economic 
behavior cannot be expected to prevent needed adjustments of this kind. 
No  reasonable government can expect the United  States to  keep to  an 
average path without deviation. Errors of  forecasting will obviously be 
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avoided. But serious and continuing deviations will cause difficulties, par- 
ticularly if they are combined with an official unwillingness to recognize 
problems that exist or to consider foreign recommendations  for U.S. policy 
actions. If, for instance, Europeans felt that the United States needed an 
incomes policy to moderate its price increases and the U.S. administration 
refused to invoke one on the ground that it would do little good, then the 
system would be weakened. As long as policies suggested by foreigners are 
aimed at goals acceptable to the United States, the administration should 
go  out  of  its way to  accept them unless they  are plainly and strongly 
counterproductive. 
I think the prospects are rather good for the United States to experience 
the kind of modal price performance required to maintain the viability of 
the system. The United States has neither the large structural imbalances 
of the French and British  economies, which require  substantial inflation for 
full capacity growth, nor the emotional and political requirement of price 
stability that prevails  in Germany, which makes moderate inflation hard to 
maintain. The condition of labor markets in the United States compared 
with those in other advanced countries is likely to be favorable for relative 
price stability in the foreseeable future. The natural rate of increase in the 
labor force is much larger in the United States than in other countries ex- 
cept Canada. Furthermore, Americans tend to be more mobile in search 
of job opportunities  than Europeans, with the possible exception of certain 
Southern Europeans who accept temporary work in Germany. While the 
United States has a much smaller reservoir  of misallocated workers in agri- 
culture and small-scale  retailing to meet labor shortages, it has more excess 
men in the armed forces and more unemployed who can be attracted  to job 
opportunities with relatively little inflation. Even if there has been an out- 
ward shift in the U.S. Phillips curve in recent years, the phenomenon has 
been quite general  among advanced countries, and there is no evidence that 
the relative position of the United States has changed. The United States 
has had on average about the right amount of price inflation during the 
1960s-a  bit too little in the early years, and a bit too much in the later 
years. Both extremes might be avoided during the 1970s, thus maintaining 
the position of the U.S. average relative to those of other countries. 
The viability of the system might be upset unnecessarily by a conflict be- 
tween reserve assets--namely, dollars and gold. This does not mean a gen- 
eral rejection of dollars by many important countries, for that would be the 
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a situation in which the dollar is generally  recognized as the most desirable 
reserve asset, but gold is still widely held by monetary authorities. It is 
conceivable that the two-tier gold market might begin to crack if the private 
price stayed much above the official price and was rising. Under these 
circumstances governments of some small countries might find a method 
for arbitraging between the official and private markets without excessive 
embarrassment. It  is conceivable, furthermore, that  another de  Gaulle 
might come to power in a major country and see tactical political advantage 
in converting dollars to gold. Neither of these eventualities is very likely, 
but either could occur, to the embarrassment of the system. Under these 
circumstances, gold would have to  be completely demonetized with the 
United States switching its obligation within the IMF to SDRs. Even with- 
out a crisis, the system would be strengthened  if there were explicit recog- 
nition of the eventual demonetization of gold, possibly in a unilateral U.S. 
declaration. 
A third route by which the viability of the system could be undermined 
would be a political rejection of the United States by other major countries. 
If, for instance, the foreign policies of the United States were so abhorrent 
to other countries that they no longer wanted to be associated with them, 
then they might stop cooperating in the international monetary system, 
even though they would suffer adverse economic consequences. Large con- 
versions of dollars into gold might not make economic sense for a country, 
but they might silence the domestic critics who question "paying for an- 
other American  Vietnam." If America were rejected  by its traditional allies, 
the demise of the dollar standard would  be among the least important 
consequences, but it might well be among the first. 
Counter-Strategies  Available to Others 
The adoption of a passive U.S. balance-of-payments strategy would re- 
quire only unilateral actions:  a refusal to  suppress disequilibria and  a 
reversal  of suppressing policies currently in force. But suppose other coun- 
tries wanted the United  States to  continue to  suppress or "correct" its 
disequilibrium,  how might they respond? Some options would seem to be 
available. It might be best to think in terms of the current situation, in 
which the United States is believed to have a "worrisome" deficit. Other 
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(and probably harsher) restrictions on American direct investors as the 
OFDI program is dismantled.  The legalities of discriminating  solely against 
American investors might cause some problems, but discrimination can be 
carried out if it is sufficiently  desired. Some Europeans are honestly wor- 
ried about the strength of the dollar, but probably an even larger number 
are worried about the growing influence of  American business in their 
economies and would welcome an excuse to restrain it. 
Unless other countries are willing to initiate a massive international eco- 
nomic conflict, attempts to  restrict American direct investors are highly 
unlikely to be very successful either in slowing the inflow of "unwanted" 
dollars or in limiting the scope of American business penetration. Capital 
flows can take many forms and cannot be effectively prevented without 
complete exchange controls; even their effectiveness  is doubtful. The money 
flow aspect, therefore, can be dismissed out of hand. Many governments 
can easily prevent new direct investment, particularly if  it involves the 
purchase  of an existing enterprise, but such restrictions will not achieve the 
desired results. With the notable exception of Japan, American firms are 
already well  established withinl  the  economies  in  which  they  want  to 
operate. Furthermore, with the freeing of international trade in goods, a 
market can frequently be served almost as easily from a neighboring coun- 
try (or from the United States itself) as from within, and thus the restriction 
of new investment would come to nought. To affect the present situation 
greatly, many countries in unison would have to  roll back the existing 
American presence; their actions would have to  include restrictions on 
output, sales, and investment of  firms legally incorporated as domestic 
citizens, as well as many new trade barriers. Reasonable governments will 
not want to embark on this course, for it is sure to lead to the strongest 
retaliation from  the  United  States  and  undermine foreign  investment 
everywhere. 
Alternatively, other countries might threaten to restrict their exports to 
the United States to prevent the earning of unwanted dollars. The exports 
would have to be very special indeed for the United States to feel much 
deprivation  from their absence. Furthermore, the exporting interests in the 
restricting  country will be hurt directly and will probably force a change in 
government policy long before it forces the United States to consider sup- 
pressing its deficit. If countries are accumulating unwanted reserves, they 
can make the optimum response and appreciate their currencies. 
If they are greatly dissatisfied with the U.S.  strategy, the most likely 356  Lawrence B. Krause 
response of  other countries would be selective sniping at the U.S.  gold 
stock-not  enough conversions to threaten the system, but enough to get 
the message across. No doubt this would cause some uneasiness at certain 
levels within the U.S.  government, but the anxiety should be easily over- 
come. To maintain confidence, the United States must be prepared to use 
its reserve assets from time to time. Simple welfare considerations would 
suggest that the United States would gain from using SDRs that pay low 
interest to retire some dollar liabilities that pay higher interest. Further- 
more, the credibility of the eventual demonetization of gold can be estab- 
lished only if the United States is willing to reduce its gold stock when it 
can gain an advantage from doing so. There may be opportunities for the 
United States to retire dollar liabilities, which, if initiated by the United 
States itself, would  enhance  foreign belief  in  U.S.  self-confidence and 
thereby forestall sniping against the dollar. But if sniping should start, the 
passive strategy requires that the United States not respond adversely to 
small gold conversions, as sensitivity to losses can only encourage them. 
The most effective tactic available to other countries to counter a passive 
strategy by the United States would be an appeal to the "better nature" of 
American officials. This is the strategy of negotiating from weakness fre- 
quently employed by  friendly countries against the  United  States. The 
appeal begins with an explicit recognition that other countries will be forced 
to accede to U.S. desires even if they do not believe it is in their own self- 
interest. This is followed by a "however" paragraph: Doesn't  America 
want to pay her own way in the world? Is it really fair for American firms 
to buy out European businesses with dollars that European central banks 
are subsequently forced to hold against their better judgment? Shouldn't 
the United States also bear some of the burden of adjustment when it is in 
deficit even though it bears less burden than other countries? 
Such an appeal, when skillfully employed, is an effective strategy against 
the United States. Americans have a strong sense of moral conviction and 
many officials have believed in the past that deficits are sinful. After many 
years of preaching about the need to correct the U.S. balance-of-payments 
deficit, a failure  to do so appears  to reflect a lack of American will. Further- 
more, the appeal is flattering to many Americans for it exaggerates U.S. 
power to bring about changes in the world economy. The vision of the 
early postwar years is re-created: If the United States can overcome a mas- 
sive surplus, why not a modest deficit? 
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the realities of the situation and to evaluate correctly its responsibilities 
and its ability to meet them. An American deficit, if it did exist, can be 
perpetuated only if other countries maintain undervalued currencies rela- 
tive to the dollar. Unlike the United States, other countries can change 
their exchange rates. If they want to end a U.S. deficit, they can do so; but 
if they want to maintain undervalued currencies, there is no effective U.S. 
policy to force an end to their surpluses. Americans can buy foreign assets 
at bargain prices only because of a lack of competition by foreigners for 
their own assets or because of undervalued  currencies. Both conditions are 
correctable  only by foreign governments.  The United States unquestionably 
will bear a burden when a deficit is adjusted, for Americans will be able to 
absorb fewer real resources from abroad; only the mechanism for effec- 
tuating the adjustment  is in dispute. The real burden that the United States 
must shoulder should not be confused with the problem of invoking the 
adjustment  mechanism, which does fall to others. Finally, the United States 
must recognize its primary economic responsibility to maximize the eco- 
nomic welfare of its own citizens. It cannot do this for the entire world even 
if it wanted to try. If the United States can meet its domestic needs while 
avoiding extremes of economic performance, then it will also serve the rest 
of the world very well. If better economic policy will result from a passive 
balance-of-payments strategy by the United States, this strategy is to be 
greatly preferred. 
Evolutionary  Developments  Possible in the Future 
One can speculate on how the dollar standard might evolve in the future. 
It could be replaced by a flexible exchange rate arrangement as countries 
become more expert at, and comfortable with, parity changes, but this is 
quite unlikely. Alternatively, the dollar standard could evolve into a sub- 
stantially different system of fixed exchange rates. The passive strategy, as 
I envisage it, implies a mechanism for evolution, as all reserve growth over 
time would be provided by SDRs; this development would soon lead to a 
dollar-SDR standard. There is no reason for the United States to impede 
this development since it is paying market rates of interest on its official 
dollar liabilities and is thus not earning any seigniorage on its own creation 
of  international money. Forced replacement of  dollars by SDRs  in re- 
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As more and more SDRs enter the system, the IMF will have to take a 
more active role in advising individual countries on the management of 
their  official reserves. This  could  be  the  mechanism whereby the  IMF 
evolves into a real central bank, such as discussed by William McChesney 
Martin.". In time, the management of the IME could become the con- 
trollers of SDR creation, reducing the role of the member countries to the 
establishers of guidelines for the IMF's managing director. The IMF could 
also easily expand its role in the determination of exchange rates within a 
system of fixed exchange rates. If its studies indicated that a currency was. 
under- or overvalued, the managing director at his own initiative could 
open discussions with the country with the aim of  effectuating a parity 
change. It is conceivable that the IME could exert some leverage by making 
a parity change a necessary condition for use of its facilities. Even further 
down the road, the IMF  could contemplate open market operations in 
financial markets of member countries for the purpose of reaching mone- 
tary targets cooperatively decided upon. At the end of this development, 
the world might have a pure SDR standard. 
Another line of evolution might come in Europe with the development 
of monetary union within the European Economic Community. While the 
1980 target date for the completion of monetary union seems totally un- 
realistic, particularly  if the community expands to include the United King- 
dom and other countries, real monetary union might be possible at some 
stage. If it should come about, the European currency would be as useful 
as the dollar for most international purposes and probably much better for 
the international trade of goods. By then the EEC will probably account 
for over 50 percent of world trade (inclusive of intracommunity trade). 
While little can be anticipated at this juncture, nothing in these develop- 
ments per se would adversely affect the welfare of the United States. 
Conclusion:  The Economics and the Politics 
The rationale for the adoption by the United States of a passive balance- 
of-payments strategy rests on two main economic arguments: It would lead 
directly and indirectly to somewhat better economic performance for the 
11. See "Toward  a World Central  Bank?"  paper presented  by William McChesney 
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United  States and it  would  help improve the  international adjustment 
mechanism. Relief from balance-of-payments  constraints on monetary and 
fiscal policies may be of particular importance for the economic situation 
in  which the  United  States  now  finds itself-underemployed  domestic 
resources combined with a possible balance-of-payments deficit, a classic 
conflict situation. Policy makers in the United States should design mea- 
sures to  meet its domestic needs-a  very difficult task in itself-and  let 
other countries control the international consequences. The international 
adjustment  mechanism  itself will be strengthened  if the United States ceases 
its attempts to suppress  its deficit, attempts that in any event are ineffective. 
The mechanism will be improved if the obligation to act is placed on those 
who have effective policy instruments at their disposal. 
Some Americans are reluctant to endorse explicitly a passive balance-of- 
payments strategy or even to recognize the realities of the dollar standard. 
Their argument,  based on political considerations, is that the United States 
would appear arrogant, irresponsible, and unconcerned about other coun- 
tries if it took such a stand. It might anger our European friends, some of 
whom still cherish the myth that the international monetary system is or 
should be like the original Bretton Woods conception. 
The concept of a passive balance-of-payments stategy did not grow out 
of the arrogance  of the United States, but out of the recognition of its rela- 
tive weakness. The mechanism essentially tries to match obligations with 
ability to  act. It  would appear that suppressing a balance-of-payments 
deficit would be the irresponsible act, and exposing it the first important 
step toward correction. The United States does care about other countries; 
the totality of its policies amply demonstrates this truth. But it cannot let 
concern  over foreign feelings prevent effective action  that  is  generally 
desirable. 
The difficulty involved in making the passive strategy understood and 
acceptable to other countries can, perhaps, be moderated by stressing the 
positive political gains to be expected from it. The United States need no 
longer subject less developed couintries  to aid-tying agreements. Aid tying, 
particularly with additionality requirements, involves the  United  States 
very deeply in the economic planninog  of aid recipients-to  benefit itself, 
not the recipients.  The demise of this destructive  practice will improve inter- 
national relations. Furthermore, U.S. security commitments abroad have 
been subjected to balance-of-payments  constraints, particularly  in Europe. 
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analysis of the budget process, they should not be judged in terms of their 
balance-of-payments impact. A passive strategy would bring this desired 
principle closer to reality and thus would improve political relations with 
European governments. No doubt other political gains would also follow, 
and, therefore, general acceptance of the policy may not be as difficult to 
achieve as it first appears. Comments  and 
Discussion 
William Branson: I basically agree with the proposition that our balance- 
of-payments strategy should be passive. Aggregate policy tools should be 
set to meet domestic needs and not to prevent deficits in the balance of 
payments. But my reasons for reaching the overall policy prescription are 
somewhat different  from those set forth in this paper. Krause bases his case 
for a passive balance-of-payments  policy upon the fulfillment  by the United 
States of its international responsibilities for the viability of the current 
system. I  think that keying the  argument for  a passive strategy to  the 
maintenance of the present system puts the strategy in conflict with the 
longer-run goal  of  improving the  system through reform toward  more 
flexible exchange rates. 
If the U.S. economy moves back to full employment with prices rising 
by only 3 percent a year and the balance of payments is nevertheless in 
deficit, what can we do about it? The correct answer is nothing, Krause 
and I concur. However, my reasons are different from his. First of all, a 
deficit in the U.S. balance of payments under these conditions could occur 
only if the dollar is overvalued. The United States cannot do much about 
that. It is up to other countries to change their exchange rates. Other coun- 
tries are reluctant  to revalue, both because of domestic political considera- 
tions and because of the oligopoly problem of international exchange rates: 
No  one country wants to make a change because it has to worry about 
what the other countries will do. Until other countries revalue, the United 
States would run a balance-of-payments deficit at full emnployment  even 
with relative price stability. 
There are five strategies that other countries could adopt in response to 
our deficit. First, foreign countries could try to control the inflow of U.S. 
capital. Krause thinks this would cause the United States to retaliate, but 
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I think the United  States should accept-even  welcome-actions  by re- 
cipient nations to prevent an undesired inflow of our capital. Their taking 
over that responsibility would be of net benelit to the United States. Sec- 
ond,  other countries could reduce exports to,  or increase imports from, 
the  United  States, which should be fine with the United  States. Third, 
foreign countries could hold inereasing amounts of dollars. The United 
States  should  hardly  object  to  having  its  balance-of-payments deficit 
financed by other countries. 
Fourth, as Krause says, other countries could snipe at the gold stock, 
but there is only $11 billion left to take. I would agree with Krause that 
we should consider demonetizing under those circumstances. If the United 
States is going to lose the gold stock, it would be better to buy goods with 
the gold or to give it to less developed countries than to trade it for dollar 
liabilities. Finally, countries could revalue, and this is the best of all possi- 
bilities. None of these strategies harms the United States. Thus, the argu- 
ment for a passive balance-of-payments  policy should not rest on the inter- 
national responsibilities  of the United States, but rather on the need to use 
stabilization tools for domestic goals. The achievement by domestic policy 
of roughly full employment with a 3 percent rate of price increase would be 
a happy outcome for the international as well as the domestic scene. 
William Feliner: I am in agreement with what I consider the main thesis of 
Lawrence Krause's paper, though this agreement does not extend to  all 
propositions in his study. I may begin by offerinlg  an alternative forrmula- 
tion of what to me seems the ilain  thesis, which may serve to call attention 
to other aspects of the matter. 
The balance-of-payments constraint has unique characteristics for the 
United States. If other countries have a persistent deficit that the rest of 
the world is unwilling to finance, they have a choice between deflation (in 
relation to the rest of the world) and devaluation. The United States has a 
choice between deflation and causing other countries to let the dollar rate 
decline in terms of their currencies  pr  ovided  they consider themselves over- 
supplied with dollars. This difference results from the practice of pegging 
other currencies  to the dollar. In actual fact the present degree of American 
monetary fiscal restraint is determined by domestic objectives rather than 
by balance-of-payments  considerations. This means that we have adopted 
the position, previously taken by other countries, of readiness to devalue if 
more than the domestically tolerable degree of monetary tightness should A Passive Balance-of-Payments Strategy  363 
be required  to prevent an excess supply of our currency in foreign markets. 
Theforrn of the U.S. balance-of-payments  constraint is distinctive because 
devaluation of the dollar can come about only by the upward revaluation 
of other currencies; and the content of our constraint is distinctive because 
within broadly set limits the rest of the world seems to prefer to finance our 
deficits at unchanging currency rates rather than to  revalue upward in 
relation to the dollar. 
Such is the actual state of affairs, though for a decade American policy 
makers have believed it to be inexcusably rude to admit it. Fortunately, a 
small change has recently occurred, in  that  not  literally alli our policy 
makers now remain unwilling to describe frankly the central characteristic 
of the present international monetary system. But most of them continue 
to deny the validity of the foregoing diagnosis. They still give the impres- 
sion  that  we  confront the  same  constraint that  faces  deficit countries 
abroad, and that it merely takes us somewhat longer to produce the alleg- 
edly required  results. This lip service to a very specific version of the prin- 
ciple of international equality cannot help but miscarry. Our negotiating 
partners know perfectly well what the situation really is. But some Ameri- 
can experts  may by now not see so clearly, for, having persisted  long enough 
in paying lip service, one is likely to  believe one's own words (more or 
less). 
One drawback  of shying away from the right diagnosis is that we have in 
fact suggested, by several gestures, that we wish to behave as if we had the 
same kind of balance-of-payments  difficulty as other deficit countries. For 
example, we have forced American companies investing abroad to borrow 
in foreign markets on a significant scale. I wonder what useful results are 
supposed to flow from this complicated network of administrative regula- 
tions. I think its disadvantages  have been considerable both for the United 
States and for other countries. 
Being in agreement with what I regard as the main thesis of Lawrence 
Krause's paper, I will merely make two brief observations on aspects of 
the problem concerning which my conclusions differ from his. 
First, I would not describe the present system as the "dollar standard." 
Even if we limit ourselves to the past decade, we must record a large num- 
ber of changes of currency  rates relative to the dollar, including changes of 
the rates of five of the Group of Ten currencies (which, of course, means 
five out of nine). The gold standard would not have been called that if 
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It is true that Krause's paper suggests the existence of the dollar standard 
mainly for the period that began when the two-tier system was introduced, 
but rate changes were made for three of the Group of Ten countries during 
this recent period of less than three years. Also,  I would hope that the 
future will bring more flexibility than did the past, and that this flexibility 
will express itself in rate changes that are allowed to develop in very small 
gradations. I believe that we do not in fact have any "standard"  in the sense 
in which the gold standard was a  standard, and that we  should avoid 
establishing any standard in that  sense. What we  do  have is  a  dollar- 
centered international monetary system into which the rest of the world 
can introduce as much flexibility as it desires. 
Second, the fact that the United States has an interest in promoting flexi- 
bility as a remedy against oversupply, and that therefore American influ- 
ence should be exerted in that direction, qualifies the principle of passivity 
in a limited way. Krause recognizes this fact, but I would not go along with 
all the conclusions he derives from it. 
Assume that the rest of the world accumulates very large dollar balances 
over a period of several years-thus  buying from us, as it were, dollars 
instead of  goods-but  that  subsequently the  major countries  start re- 
valuing upward on  a significant scale relative to  the dollar. Temporary 
willingness to buy dollars instead of goods could then be viewed as a gift 
to us. However, such a gift shares some of the properties of the gift rep- 
resented by the dumping of foreign goods into the United  States. Such 
gifts have some characteristics  of the Trojan horse, because they  damage 
American industries whose full output will be needed again as soon as the 
gift is withdrawn  (in our case, withdrawn  through abrupt revaluations). At 
the same time the interests of the other countries are also hurt by such 
abrupt  changes; indeed, they are more vulnerable than we are because they 
are more dependent on international trade. What follows from this is that 
gradualness  in the behavior of other countries in relation to the dollar is a 
desirable objective that we should promote as best we can. 
Yet Krause seems to feel that in the mutual interest of the international 
community a further conclusion should also be drawn. According to his 
view, as I interpret it, we should try to use our influence to see that the 
monetary agencies of the world are supplied with enough special drawing 
rights to make them unwilling to accumulateffurther  dollars. This would 
mean using SDRs as a means of pressing for a devaluation of the dollar 
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at the prevailing exchange rates. The behavior of the rest of the world sug- 
gests very strongly that they do not consider such a policy to be in their 
interest; nor-it  may be unnecessary  to add-would  it be in the American 
interest. Even after reducing our inflation to a tolerable rate we might turn 
out to be running  a deficit at the going dollar rates. Within  limits the rest of 
the world is very likely to continue to have a preference for accumulating 
additional  reserves  in the form of dollars rather  than in other forms, though 
it could  avoid further  dollar accumulations by a sufficient  degree of revalua- 
tion  of  various currencies. I  do  not  understand why American policy 
makers should try to change the minds of the policy makers of the other 
countries in this regard. 
Lawrence  Krause: In response to William Branson, let me briefly elaborate 
my reasons for arguing the case for a passive strategy in terms of U.S. 
world responsibility rather than in terms solely of U.S.  domestic needs. 
Our stance on the balance of payments is part of our overall foreign policy. 
We can't be talking NATO  obligation, responsibility vis-a-vis less devel- 
oped countries, and so forth, and at the same time thrust a balance-of-pay- 
ments strategy on other countries by force. If we were irresponsible in that 
way,  we might encounter irresponsible reactions from  other countries. 
They might not confine themselves to the five kinds of corrective actions 
Branson offered. They could react in pique to our unilateral decision and 
do things that are harmful both to themselves and to us. If I'm putting 
sugar coating on the pill, I see good reasons to do so. 
In putting the passive strategy on this basis, I concede that it may inhibit 
the movement toward flexible exchange rates. That movement is in the 
hands of other countries. 
General  Discussion 
Several participants  commented on Krause's argument that it would be 
necessary  for the United States to have a modal price performance in order 
to  make the passive strategy effective. John Kareken expressed concern 
that this might severely  constrain U.S. domestic policies. R. J. Gordon also 
felt it would be dangerous to choose the domestic rate of inflation on the 
basis of a guess as to the modal rate overseas. The U.S. domestic rate of 
inflation should reflect domestic preferences about the trade-off between 366  Lawrence B. Krause 
inflation and unemployment. William Branson questioned whether modal 
price  behavior was  important. While  Krause  had  suggested it  would 
minimize the frequency of parity changes, Branson stressed that this would 
depend on the divergence of the rates of inflation among all countries, 
regardless of whether the United States had a fast, slow, or middling rate 
of inflation. William Poole observed that U.S. policies that determine our 
rate of inflation will in part determine the rate of inflation in foreign coun- 
tries. He, Walter Heller, and Ronald McKinnon suggested that there is a 
worrisome lack of determinacy in such a system. 
Krause found it conceivable that the system could operate with most 
countries appreciating most of the time, if they maintained a price per- 
formance substantially more stable than the U.S.  performance. But this 
would lead to  a declining value for gold and SDRs  over time. As  Paul 
Samuelson had pointed out in a letter to Krause, ". . . the only difference 
between a depreciation of the dollar and an appreciation of other curren- 
cies is differential effects on the value of stocks of liabilities and assets, 
that is, official  gold and SDRs." Krause concluded: "I think other countries 
would eventually become irritated by the declining value of their gold and 
dollars and would not permit the system to be maintained." 
Several participants commented  on  possible  impacts  of  the  passive 
strategy on the freedom of world trade and capital movements. William 
Poole  suggested that  significant U.S.  deficits engendered by  a  passive 
balance-of-payments  policy could substantially  increase protectionist senti- 
ment in the United States. American businessmen are not directly  interested 
in correcting a deficit in the balance of payments, but as William Fellner 
pointed out, continued deficits result, in essence, in the dumping of foreign 
goods in the United States, generating pressures on individual industries. 
If the deficits persist, problems connected with trade efficiency may de- 
velop. Warren Smith feared that other countries might move to  restric- 
tionist trade and capital controls rather than altering exchange rates. He 
also agreed with Poole that pressure might develop in the United States to 
put on tariffs, quotas, and other means of controlling imports. James Tobin 
argued, however, that the present wave of protectionist sentiment was the 
result of the recession and the specific difficulties of particular industries, 
and expressed  doubt about the empirical validity of the alleged relationship 
between protectionist sentiment and the trade balance. 
A number of comments touched on the question of how much the bal- 
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stabilization policies. Lawrence Klein felt that the past two decades had 
witnessed a trend toward greater  concern with the balance of payments and 
saw that trend continuing, barring a major change in the system. From the 
situation of the sixties when "we undertook many mlonetary and fiscal 
policies with at least half an eye on the balance of payments," we seemed 
likely to have "a full eye" on international payments in the seventies. Both 
R. A. Gordon and Warren Smith stated that the balance of payments had 
restrained  monetary policy in the early sixties. James Tobin suggested, on 
the other hand, that the posture of fiscal and monetary policy in that period 
had been based primarily on domestic political and economic considera- 
tions. In his view, the balance of payments had done damage, not so much 
in terms of domestic macroeconomic goals as in terms of restrictions on 
internationial  trade and capital movements. 
R. A.  Gordon questiolned  the political realism of amicable acceptance 
of the passive strategy, given the deep feelings about balance-of-payments 
discipline and national sovereignty both in the United States and abroad. 
William Poole noted that Krause had pointed to greater flexibility of ex- 
change rates as the best solution, but ruled that out as politically impos- 
sible. It was far from obvious that the passive strategy was more feasible 
politically; the lesson, he felt, was that economists are well advised to avoid 
playing "amateur politicians." 
Krause responded: "There is no difference for U.S.  policy between a 
world of flexible exchange rates and one of a passive strategy. With flexible 
exchange rates, all countries would follow a passive strategy and let the 
market adjust  rates. I would prefer flexible exchange rates, but since Ameri- 
can policy is the same under either approach, I do not draw a sharp distinc- 
tion. Because I know my limitations as an amateur politician, I hesitate to 
judge how or how readily we might get other governments to accept either 
reality." 
John Kareken suggested that U.S.  policy was perhaps already moving 
toward the stance Krause proposed. He cited a recent statement by Paul 
McCracken: 
The United  States  has a heavy  obligation  for domestic  and external  reasons  to 
relieve  the long over-heating  of our economy  and the resulting  inflation.  At that 
point, however,  the international  adjustment  process  must  take over  and perform 
the remainder  of the  equilibrating  function.  Otherwise  the  world  may  be pressured 
by the strains  from inadequate  adjustment  processes, inconsistent  balance-of- 
payments  objectives,  and  domestic  pressures  for full employment  into measures  of 368  Lawrence B. Krause 
restriction  that would set us all on the road to protectionist  measures,  barriers, 
and preferences  that would constrict  trade  and create  abrasive  political  relation- 
ships among  nations.' 
Walter Salant said that Krause's preference for an American choice of 
policy targets in terms of national benefits depends on the fact that other 
countries can use the policy instrument of exchange rate variations while 
the United States cannot. If long-run trends are in the direction of increas- 
ing economic integration and wider common currency areas, then parts of 
the world ought to be moving toward fixity of rates. If the dollar is to be- 
come, in effect, a common currency for an area of the world, then policy 
targets should be chosen in light of the whole area's benefits. 
1. Speech-  before the U.S. Council of the International  Chamber  of Commerce,  New 
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